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ABSTRACT Many blockchain-based protocols, such as Bitcoin, implement a decentralized asset
transfer system. As clearly stated in the original paper by Nakamoto, the crux of this problem lies
in prohibiting any participant from engaging in double-spending. There seems to be a common
belief that consensus is necessary for solving the double-spending problem. Indeed, whether it is
for a permissionless or a permissioned environment, the typical solution uses consensus to build a
totally ordered ledger of submitted transfers.
In this paper we show that this common belief is false: consensus is not needed to implement a
decentralized asset transfer system. We do so by introducing AT2 (Asynchronous Trustworthy
Transfers), a class of consensusless algorithms.
To show formally that consensus is unnecessary for asset transfers, we first consider this problem
in the shared-memory context. We introduce AT2SM , a wait-free algorithm that asynchronously
implements asset transfer in the read-write shared-memory model. In other words, we show that
the consensus number of an asset-transfer object is one.
In the message passing model with Byzantine faults, we introduce a generic asynchronous
algorithm called AT2MP and discuss two instantiations of this solution. First, AT2D ensures
deterministic guarantees and consequently targets a small scale deployment (tens to hundreds of
nodes), typically for a private, i.e, permissioned, environment. Second, AT2P provides probabilistic
guarantees and scales well to a very large system size (tens of thousands of nodes), ensuring
logarithmic latency and communication complexity. Instead of consensus, we construct AT2D and
AT2P on top of a broadcast primitive with causal ordering guarantees offering deterministic and
probabilistic properties, respectively.
Whether for the deterministic or probabilistic model, our AT2 algorithms are both simpler and
faster than solutions based on consensus. In systems of up to 100 replicas, regardless of system
size, AT2D outperforms consensus-based solutions offering a throughput improvement ranging
from 1.5x to 6x , while achieving a decrease in latency of up to 2x . (Not shown in this version
of the document.) AT2P obtains sub-second transfer execution on a global scale deployment of
thousands of nodes.
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AT2: Asynchronous Trustworthy Transfers 3
1 INTRODUCTION
In 2008, Satoshi Nakamoto introduced the Bitcoin protocol, implementing an electronic asset
transfer system (often called a cryptocurrency) without any central authority [54]. Since then,
many alternatives to Bitcoin came to prominence, designed for either the permissionless (public) or
permissioned (private) setting. These include major cryptocurrencies such as Ethereum [67] or
Ripple [57], as well as systems sparked from research or industry efforts such as Bitcoin-NG [27],
Algorand [30], ByzCoin [43], Stellar [51], Hyperledger [7], Corda [36], or Solida [2]. Each of these
alternatives brings novel approaches to implementing decentralized transfers, and may offer a
more general interface in the form of smart contracts [63]. They improve over Bitcoin in various
aspects, such as performance, scalability, energy-efficiency, or security.
A common theme in these protocols, whether they are for transfers [44] or smart contracts [67],
is that they seek to implement a blockchain. This is a distributed ledger where all the transfers
in the system are totally ordered. Achieving total order among multiple inputs (e.g., transfers) is
fundamentally a hard task, equivalent to solving consensus [28, 35].
Consensus is a central problem in distributed computing, known for its notorious difficulty.
Consensus has no deterministic solution in asynchronous systems if just a single participant can
fail [28]. Algorithms for solving consensus are tricky to implement correctly [1, 21, 23], and they
face tough trade-offs between performance, security, and energy-efficiency [8, 13, 33, 66].
As stated in the original paper by Nakamoto, the main problem of a decentralized cryptocurrency
is preventing a malicious participant from spending the same money more than once [54]. This is
known as the double-spending attack. Bitcoin and follow-up systems typically assume that total
order—and thus consensus—is vital to preventing double-spending [29]. Indeed, there seems to
be a common belief that solving consensus is necessary for implementing a decentralized asset
transfer system [15, 33, 41, 54].
Our main contribution in this paper is showing that this common belief is false. We show that
total order is not required to avoid double-spending in decentralized transfer systems. We do so
by introducing AT2 (Asynchronous Trustworthy Transfers), a class of consensusless algorithms.
As a starting point, we consider the shared memory model with benign failures. In this model,
we give a precise definition of a transfer system as a sequential object type. It is for pedagogical
purposes that we start from this model, as it allows us to study the relation between the transfer
object and consensus, and later extend our result to the message passing model. We introduce
AT2SM , an asset transfer algorithm that has consensus number one [37]. In other words, decentral-
ized asset transfer does not need consensus in its implementation, and we can avoid maintaining a
total order across transfers.
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To get an intuition why total order is not necessary, consider a set of users who transfer money
between their accounts in a decentralized manner. For simplicity, assume the full replication model,
where every user maintains a copy of the state of every account. We observe that most operations
in a transfer system commute, i.e., different users can apply the operations in arbitrary order,
resulting in the same final state. For instance, a transfer T1 from Alice to Bob commutes with a
transferT2 from Carol to Drake. This is because the two transfers involve different accounts. In the
absence of other transfers, T1 and T2 can be applied in different orders by different users, without
affecting correctness.
Consider now a more interesting case when two transfers involve the same account. For example,
let us throw into the mix a transfer T0 from Alice to Carol. Assume that Alice issues T0 before she
issues T1. Note that T0 and T1 do not commute, because they involve the same account—that of
Alice—and it is possible that she cannot fulfill both T0 and T1 (due to insufficient balance). We say
that T1 depends on T0, and so T0 should be applied before T1.
Furthermore, suppose that Carol does not have enough money in her account to fulfill T2 before
she receives transfer T0 from Alice. In this case, transfer T2 depends on T0. Thus, all users should
apply T0 before applying T2, while transfers T1 and T2 still commute. The partial ordering among
these three transfers is in fact given by a causality relationship.
In Figure 1 we show the scenario with these three transfers and the causality relation between
them. Intuitively, the general ordering constraint we seek to enforce is that every outgoing transfer
for an account causally depends on all preceding transfers involving that—and only that—account.
Alice
Bob
Carol
Drake
T2
T0
T1
T0
depends-on
T1 T2
Fig. 1. A simple scenario illustrating, on the left side, three transfers among four participants. On the
right side, we depict the dependencies among these three transfers. The dependencies are established by a
causality-based ordering relationship.
We then extend our result to the model of Byzantine fault-prone processes that communicate
via passing messages. In this model, we show how to sidestep consensus by presenting AT2MP , a
generic algorithm that implements decentralized asset transfer atop a variant of secure broadcast.
We describe two variants of this generic solution. The first, called AT2D, has deterministic guaran-
tees that targets a smaller scale deployment (tens to hundreds of nodes) typically for a private
environment. The second, called AT2P, ensures probabilistic guarantees and scales well to very
large system sizes, typically for a public setting.
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It is well-known that the main bottleneck in blockchain-based systems is their consensus
module [36, 61, 66]. Numerous solutions have emerged to alleviate this problem [31, 36]. Typical
techniques seek to employ a form of sharding [44], for instance, or to use a committee-based
optimization [27, 30]. With AT2, we circumvent this main bottleneck, yielding new solutions that
bypass consensus altogether.
Whether for the deterministic or probabilistic model, our AT2MP algorithms are both simpler
and faster than solutions based on consensus. In systems of up to 100 replicas, regardless of system
size, AT2D outperforms consensus-based solutions offering a throughput improvement ranging
from 1.5x to 6x , while achieving a decrease in latency of up to 2x . AT2P obtains sub-second transfer
execution on a global scale deployment of thousands of nodes.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We first define the asset transfer object type in
the crash-stop shared memory model and show that it has consensus number one for accounts
with a single owner (§2). We then move to the message passing model with Byzantine failures and
present AT2MP , a generic algorithm for implementing distributed asset transfer on top of a secure
broadcast primitive (§3). Next, we focus on one deterministic and one probabilistic version of
the secure broadcast primitive, yielding, respectively, AT2D (§4) and AT2P (§5), our deterministic
and probabilistic flavors of AT2 for the Byzantine message passing model. At the end, we revisit
the crash-stop shared memory model to prove that a general asset transfer object has consensus
number k if an account is shared by k (but not more) processes (§6). Finally, we discuss related
work (§7) and conclude (§8). Insights behind the analyses of our algorithms can be found in the
appendices.
2 CONSENSUSLESS ASSET TRANSFERWITH AT2SM
In this section we formally define the asset transfer problem and discuss its consensus number. We
begin with presenting the shared memory model we use in this section (§2.1) and then precisely
define the problem of asset-transfer as a sequential object type (§2.2).
Intuitively, an asset-transfer object consists of accounts whose balances can be read by all
processes. Processes are also allowed to transfer assets between accounts, where each account
is associated with a subset of processes (owners) that are allowed to issue transfers debiting this
account.
Finally, we prove that an object of this type where each account has a single owner has consensus
number one. We do so by proposing a wait-free implementation of this object called AT2SM (§2.3).
The interested reader is referred to §6 that generalizes this result, proving that an object containing
an account with k owners has consensus number k .
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2.1 Shared Memory Model Definitions
Processes. As our basic system model, we assume a set Π of N asynchronous processes that
communicate by invoking atomic operations on shared memory objects. Processes are sequential—
we assume that a process never invokes a new operation before obtaining a response from a
previous one.
Object types. A sequential object type is defined as a tuple T = (Q,q0,O,R,∆), where Q is
a set of states, q0 ∈ Q is an initial state, O is a set of operations, R is a set of responses and
∆ ⊆ Q × Π ×O ×Q × R is a relation that associates a state, a process identifier and an operation to
a set of possible new states and corresponding responses. Here we assume that ∆ is total on the
first three elements, i.e., for each state q ∈ Q , each process p ∈ Π, and each operation o ∈ O , some
transition to a new state is defined, i.e., ∃q′ ∈ Q, r ∈ R: (q,p,o,q′, r ) ∈ ∆.
A history is a sequence of invocations and responses, each invocation or response associated
with a process identifier. A sequential history is a history that starts with an invocation and in
which every invocation is immediately followed with a response associated with the same process.
A sequential history (j1,o1), (j1, r1), (j2,o2), (j2, r2), . . ., where ∀i ≥ 1, ji ∈ Π, oi ∈ O, ri ∈ R, is
legal with respect to type T = (Q,q0,O,R,∆) if there exists a sequence q1,q2, . . . of states in Q
such that ∀i ≥ 1, (qi−1, ji ,oi ,qi , ri ) ∈ ∆.
Implementations. An implementation of an object typeT is a distributed algorithm that, for each
process and invoked operation, prescribes the actions that the process needs to take to perform it.
An execution of an implementation is a sequence of events: invocations and responses of operations,
send and receive events, or atomic accesses to shared abstractions. The sequence of events at every
process must respect the algorithm assigned to it.
Failures. Processes are subject to crash failures. A process may halt prematurely, in which case
we say that the process is crashed. A process is called faulty if it crashes during the execution. A
process is correct if it is not faulty. All algorithms we present in the shared memory model are
wait-free—every correct process eventually returns from each operation it invokes, regardless of
an arbitrary number of other processes crashing.
Linearizability and sequential consistency. For each pattern of operation invocations, the
execution produces a history, i.e., the sequence of distinct invocations and responses, labelled with
process identifiers and unique sequence numbers.
A projection of a history H to process p, denoted H |p is the subsequence of elements of H
labelled with p. An invocation o by a process p is incomplete in H if it is not followed by a response
in H |p. A history is complete if it has no incomplete invocations. A completion of H is a history H¯
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that is identical to H except that every incomplete invocation in H is either removed or completed
by inserting a matching response somewhere after it.
A sequentially consistent implementation ofT ensures that for every history H it produces, there
exists a completion H¯ and a legal sequential history S such that for all processes p, H¯ |p = S |p.
A linearizable implementation, additionally, preserves the real-time order between operations.
Formally, an invocation o1, r1 precedes an invocation o2 in H , denoted o1 ≺H o2, if o1 is complete
and the corresponding response r1 precedes o2 in H . Note that ≺H stipulates a partial order on
invocations in H . A linearizable implementation of T ensures that for every history H it produces,
there exists a completion H¯ and a legal sequential history S such that (1) for all processes p,
H¯ |p = S |p and (2) ≺H⊆≺S .
A (sequentially consistent or linearizable) implementation is t-resilient if, under the assumption
that at most t processes crash, it ensures that every invocation performed by a correct process is
eventually followed by a response. In the special casewhen t = n−1, we say that the implementation
is wait-free.
2.2 Asset transfer type
LetA be a set of accounts and µ : A → 2Π be an “owner” map that associates each account with a
set of processes that are, intuitively, allowed to debit the account. The asset-transfer object type
associated with A and µ is then defined as a tuple (Q,q0,O,R,∆), where:
• The set of states Q is the set of all possible maps q : A → N. Intuitively, each state of the
object assigns each account its balance.
• The initialization map q0 : A → N assigns the initial balance to each account.
• Operations and responses of the type are defined as O = {transfer(a,b,x) : a,b ∈ A, x ∈
N} ∪ {read(a) : a ∈ A} and R = {true, false} ∪ N.
• For a state q ∈ Q , a proces p ∈ Π, an operation o ∈ O , a response r ∈ R and a new state
q′ ∈ Q , the tuple (q,p,o,q′, r ) ∈ ∆ if and only if one of the following conditions is satisfied:
– o = transfer(a,b,x) ∧ p ∈ µ(a) ∧ q(a) ≥ x ∧ q′(a) = q(a) − x ∧ q′(b) = q(b) + x ∧ ∀c ∈
A \ {a,b} : q′(c) = q(c) (all other accounts unchanged) ∧ r = true;
– o = transfer(a,b,x) ∧ (p < µ(a) ∨ q(a) < x ) ∧ q′ = q ∧ r = false;
– o = read(a) ∧ q = q′ ∧ r = q(a).
In other words, operation transfer(a,b,x) invoked by process p succeeds if and only if p is the
owner of the source account a and account a has enough balance, and if it does, x is transferred from
a to the destination account b. A transfer(a,b,x) operation is called outgoing for a and incoming
for b; respectively, the x units are called outgoing for a and incoming for b. A transfer is successful
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if its corresponding response is true and failed if its corresponding response is false. Operation
read(a) simply returns the balance of a and leaves the account balances untouched.
2.3 Asset Transfer Is Easier than Consensus
In this section, we discuss the “synchronization power” of the asset-transfer type in what we
believe to be the most typical use case: each account being associated with a single owner process.
We show that such an asset-transfer object type can be implemented in a wait-free manner using
only read-write registers. Thus, the type has consensus number 1. In §6 we generalize our result
and show that a “k-shared” asset-transfer object (where up to k processes may share an account)
has consensus number k .
For now, consider an asset-transfer object associated with a set of accountsA and an ownership
map µ such that ∀a ∈ A, |µ(a)| ≤ 1. We now present AT2SM , our algorithm that implements this
object in the read-write shared-memory model.
Our implementation is described in Figure 2. TheN processes share an atomic snapshot object [4]
of size N . Every process p is associated with a distinct location in the atomic snapshot object
storing the set of all successful transfer operations executed by p so far. Since each account is
owned by at most one process, all outgoing transfers for an account appear in a single location of
the atomic snapshot (associated with the owner process).
Recall that the atomic snapshot (AS) memory is represented as a vector of N shared variables that
can be accessed with two atomic operations: update and snapshot. An update operation modifies
the value at a given position of the vector and a snapshot returns the state of the whole vector. We
implement the read and transfer operations as follows.
• To read the balance of an account a, the process simply takes a snapshot S and returns the
initial balance plus the sum of incoming amounts minus the sum of all outgoing amounts.
We denote this number by balance(a, S). As we argue below, the result is guaranteed to be
non-negative, i.e., the operation is correct with respect to the type specification.
• To perform transfer(a,b,x), a process p, the owner of a, takes a snapshot S and computes
balance(a, S). If the amount to be transferred does not exceed balance(a, S), we add the
transfer operation to the set of p’s operations in the snapshot object via an update operation
and return true. Otherwise, the operation returns false.
Theorem 1. The asset-transfer object with a single owner per account type has a wait-free imple-
mentation in the read-write shared memory model.
Proof. Fix an execution E of the algorithm in Figure 2. Atomic snapshots can be wait-free
implemented in the read-write shared memory model [4]. As every operation only involves a finite
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Shared variables:
AS , atomic snapshot, initially {⊥}N
Local variables:
opsp ⊆ A × A × N, initially ∅
Upon transfer(a,b,x)
1 S := AS .snapshot()
2 if p < µ(a) ∨ balance(a, S) < x then
3 return false
4 opsp := opsp ∪ {(a,b,x)}
5 AS .update(opsp )
6 return true
Upon read(a)
7 S := AS .snapshot()
8 return balance(a, S)
Fig. 2. AT2SM : Wait-free implementation of asset-transfer with one owner per account: code for process p
number of atomic snapshot accesses, every process completes each of the operations it invokes in
a finite number of its own steps.
Let Ops be the set of:
• All invocations of transfer or read in E that returned, and
• All invocations of transfer in E that completed the update operation (line 5) (the atomic
snapshot operation has been linearized).
Let H be the history of E. We define a completion of H and, for each o ∈ Ops, we define a
linearization point as follows:
• If o is a read operation, it linearizes at the linearization point of the snapshot operation in
line 7.
• If o is a transfer operation that returns false, it linearizes at the linearization point of the
snapshot operation in line 1.
• If o is a transfer operation that completed the update operation, it linearizes at the linearization
point of the update operation in line 5. If o is incomplete in H , we complete it with response
true.
Let H¯ be the resulting complete history and let L be the sequence of complete invocations of H¯
in the order of their linearization points in E. Note that, by the way we linearize invocations, the
linearization of a prefix of E is a prefix of L.
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Now we show that L is legal and, thus, H is linearizable. We proceed by induction, starting with
the empty (trivially legal) prefix of L. Let Lℓ be the legal prefix of the first ℓ invocations and op be
the (ℓ + 1)st operation of L. Let op be invoked by process p. The following cases are possible:
• op is a read(a): the snapshot taken at the linearization point of op contains all successful
transfers concerning a in Lℓ . By the induction hypothesis, the resulting balance is non-
negative.
• op is a failed transfer(a,b,x): the snapshot taken at the linearization point of op contains all
successful transfers concerning a in Lℓ . By the induction hypothesis, the resulting balance is
non-negative.
• op is a successful transfer(a,b,x): by the algorithm, before the linearization point of op,
process p took a snapshot. Let Lk , k ≤ ℓ, be the prefix of Lℓ that only contain operations
linearized before the point in time when the snapshot was taken by p.
We observe that Lk includes a subset of all incoming transfers on a and all outgoing transfers
on a in Lℓ . Indeed, as p is the owner of a and only the owner of a can perform outgoing
transfers on a, all outgoing transfers in Lℓ were linearized before the moment p took the
snapshot within op. Thus, balance(a,Lk ) ≤ balance(a,Lℓ).1
By the algorithm, as op = transfer(a,b,x) succeeds, we have balance(a,Lk ) ≥ x . Thus,
balance(a,Lℓ) ≥ x and the resulting balance in Lℓ+1 is non-negative.
Thus, H is linearizable. □
Corollary 2. The asset-transfer object type with one owner per account has consensus number 1.
3 AT2 IN THE MESSAGE PASSING MODEL
In this section we abandon the crash-stop shared memory model that we only used for reasoning
about the consensus number of the asset-transfer data type. Instead, we consider a distributed
system where processes communicate by sending messages through authenticated channels and
where a limited fraction of processes may behave in an arbitrary (Byzantine) manner. In this
setting, Byzantine processes may attempt to double-spend, i.e., initiate transfers which cannot be
justified by the balance in their accounts.
We first refine the specification of our asset transfer abstraction to adapt it to the Byzantine
message passing model. We then present present AT2MP , an algorithm that implements this
abstraction.
1 Analogously to balance(a, S) that computes the balance for account a based on the transfers contained in snapshot S ,
balance(a,L), if L is a sequence of operations, computes the balance of account a based on all transfers in L.
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3.1 Asset Transfer in Message Passing with Byzantine Faults
We now refine our asset transfer specification for the Byzantine environment. We only require
that the transfer system behaves correctly towards benign processes, regardless of the behavior of
Byzantine ones. We say that a process is benign if it respects the algorithm and can only fail by
crashing.
Informally, we require that every system execution appears to benign processes as a correct
sequential execution. As a result, no benign process can be a victim of a double-spending attack.
Moreover, we require that this execution respects the real-time order among operations per-
formed by benign processes [37]: when such an operation completes it should be visible to every
future operation invoked by a benign process.
For the sake of efficiency, in our algorithm (§3), we slightly relax the last requirement—while
still preventing double-spending. We require that successful transfer operations invoked by benign
processes constitute a legal sequential history that preserves the real-time order. A read or a
failed transfer operation invoked by a benign process p can be “outdated”—it can be based on a
stale state of p’s balance. Informally, one can view the system requirements as linearizability [38]
for successful transfers and sequential consistency [9] for failed transfers and reads. As progress
(liveness) guarantees, we require that every operation invoked by a correct process eventually
completes. One can argue that this relaxation incurs little impact on the system’s utility, as long
as all incoming transfers are eventually applied.
3.2 AT2MP Overview
We now present AT2MP , a decentralized algorithm that implements secure transfers in a message
passing system subject to Byzantine faults. Instead of consensus, AT2MP relies on a causally
ordered broadcast which precisely captures the semantics of the transfer applications.
Figure 3 depicts the high-level modules of AT2MP . There are two main modules: one for tracking
dependencies (i.e., the applied incoming transfers), plus an underlying secure broadcast protocol.
For simplicity, in this section we present only the basic transfer algorithm and assume an existing
secure broadcast protocol as a black box (which we will describe later). Depending on the exact
system model and the properties of this broadcast protocol, we obtain two variants of AT2MP .
Concretely, we consider a deterministic secure broadcast algorithm, which we use to obtain AT2D
(§4), and a probabilistic secure broadcast protocol, which underlies AT2P (§5).
Our algorithm works as follows. To perform a transfer, a process p broadcasts a message with
the transfer details. These details match the arguments of the transfer operation (see §2.2), and
consist of the outgoing account (in this case, the account of p), the incoming account, and the
transferred amount.
12 GKMPS’18
dependency tracking
Transfer Algorithm
Secure Broadcast
broadcast deliver
Deterministic
protocol
Probabilistic
protocol
Fig. 3. High-level design of our asset transfer system. Depending on the underlying secure broadcast
primitive, there are two variants: AT2D works in the deterministic model, while AT2P has probabilistic
guarantees.
To ensure the authenticity of operations—so that no process is able to debit another process’s
account—we assume that processes sign all their messages before broadcasting them. In practice,
similar to Bitcoin and other transfer systems, every process possesses a public-private key pair
that allows only p to securely initiate transfers from its corresponding account.
Recall that in a secure transfer system, a correct process should not accept a transfer P before it
accepts all transfers P depends on. In particular, transfers originating at the same process p do not
commute, and thus must be delivered by all correct processes in the same order. This property is
known as the source order, and we ensure it by relying on secure broadcast [49].
Secure broadcast, by itself, is not sufficient to ensure that causality is preserved, because there
is an additional scenario in which two transfers do not commute. Suppose that process p has
initially zero balance and receives money in a transfer P1. Thereafter, process p immediately sends
money to process q in a transfer P2. If process q tries to apply P2 before being aware of P1, then
q would consider the former transfer invalid due to insufficient funds. Thus, P2 depends on P1
and all processes in the system should apply P1 before P2. We enforce this ordering by attaching a
dependency set—called a history—to every transfer. Before delivering a transfer, we require every
process to deliver the history attached to that transfer. Note that in practice, this history need not
contain the full details of other transfers, but merely their identifiers (in a similar vein as vector
clocks [39]).
3.3 The AT2MP Algorithm
Figure 4 describes our AT2MP consensusless algorithm implementing a transfer system (as defined
in §3.1). Each process p maintains, for each process q, an integer seq[q] reflecting the number of
transfers which process q initiated and which process p has validated and applied. Process p also
maintains, for every process q, an integer rec[q] which reflects the number of transfers which
process q has initiated and process p has delivered (but not necessarily applied).
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Local variables:
seq[ ], initially seq[q] = 0, ∀q {Number of validated transfers outgoing from q}
rec[ ], initially rec[q] = 0, ∀q {Number of delivered transfers from q}
hist[ ], initially hist[q] = ∅, ∀q {Set of validated transfers involving q}
deps, initially ∅ {Set of last incoming transfers for account of local process p}
toValidate, initially ∅ {Set of delivered (but not validated) transfers}
9 operation transfer(a,b,x) where a = p { Transfer an amount of x from account a to account b }
10 if balance(a,hist[p] ∪ deps) < x then
11 return false
12 broadcast([(a,b,x , seq[p] + 1), deps])
13 deps := ∅
14 operation read(a) { Read balance of account a }
15 return balance(a,hist[a] ∪ deps)
{ Secure broadcast callback }
16 upon deliver(q,m) { Executed when p delivers messagem from process q }
17 letm be [(q,d,y, s),h]
18 if s = rec[q] + 1 then
19 rec[q] := rec[q] + 1
20 toValidate := toValidate ∪ {(q,m)}
21 upon (q, [t ,h]) ∈ toValidate ∧ Valid(q, t ,h) { Executed when a transfer delivered from q becomes valid }
22 let t be (c,d,y, s)
23 hist[c] := hist[c] ∪ t { Update the history for the outgoing account c }
24 hist[d] := hist[d] ∪ t { Update the history for the incoming account d }
25 seq[q] := s
26 if d = p then
27 deps := deps ∪ (c,d,y, s) { This transfer is incoming to account of local process p }
28 if c = p then
29 return true { This transfer is outgoing from account of local process p }
30 function Valid(q, t ,h)
31 let t be (c,d,y, s)
32 return (q = c)
33 and (s = seq[q] + 1)
34 and (balance(c,hist[q]) ≥ y)
35 and (h ⊆ hist[q])
36 function balance(a,h)
37 return sum of incoming transfers minus outgoing transfers for account a in h
Fig. 4. AT2MP : an algorithm for a consensusless transfer system based on secure broadcast. Code for every
process p.
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Additionally, there is also a list hist[q] of transfers which involve process q. We say that a transfer
operation involves a process q if that transfer is either outgoing or incoming on the account of
q. Each process p maintains as well a local variable deps. This is a set of transfers incoming for p
that p has applied since the last successful (outgoing) transfer. Finally, the set toValidate contains
delivered transfers that are pending validation (i.e., have not been validated nor applied).
To perform a transfer operation, process p first checks the balance of its own account, and if there
is not enough funding, i.e., the balance is insufficient, returns false (line 11). Otherwise, process p
broadcasts a message with this operation via the secure broadcast primitive (line 12). This message
includes the three basic arguments of a transfer operation as well as seq[p] + 1 and dependencies
deps. Each correct process in the system eventually delivers this message via a callback from secure
broadcast (line 16). Upon delivery, process p checks this message for well-formedness (lines 17
and 18), and then adds it to the set of messages pending validation. We explain the validation
procedure later.
Once a transfer passes validation (the predicate in line 21 is satisfied), process p applies this
transfer on the local state. Applying a transfer means that process p adds this transfer to both
the history of the outgoing (line 23) and incoming accounts (line 24). If the transfer is incoming
for local process p, it is also added to deps, the set of current dependencies for p (line 27). If the
transfer is outgoing for p, i.e., it is the currently pending transfer operation invoked by p, then the
response true is returned (line 29).
To perform a read(a) operation for account a, process p simply computes the balance of this
account based on the local history hist[a] (line 37).
Before applying a transfer op from some process q, process p validates op via the Valid function
(lines 30–35). To be valid, op must satisfy four conditions. The first condition is that process q
(the issuer of transfer op) must be the owner of the outgoing account for op (line 32). Second, any
preceding transfers that process q issued must have been validated (line 33). Third, the balance of
account q must not drop below zero (line 34). Finally, the reported dependencies of op (encoded in
h of line 35) must have been validated and exist in hist[q].
4 AT2D: THE DETERMINISTIC CASE
AT2D implements a transfer algorithm for the deterministic system model. It builds on a secure
broadcast algorithm which assumes an asynchronous network of N processes, where less than
N /3 of processes can be Byzantine. We briefly discuss this broadcast algorithm here, while the
rest of the transfer algorithm is identical to the one we described earlier (Figure 4).
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4.1 Deterministic Secure Broadcast
Secure broadcast for the deterministic model has its roots in the Asynchronous Byzantine Agree-
ment (ABA) problem, defined by Bracha and Toueg [18]. ABA is a single-shot abstraction for
agreeing on the content of a single message broadcast from a designated sender. Informally, secure
broadcast is a multi-shot version of ABA, and guarantees that messages broadcast by a given
(correct) sender are delivered by all correct processes in the same order.
There are multiple algorithms for implementing secure broadcast in deterministic systemmodels,
e.g., the double-echo algorithm, initially described by Bracha [17] as a single-shot version (which
appears in several other works, including practical systems [19, 20, 26]), as well as the secure
reliable multicast of Reiter [58], which relies on digital signatures and which was optimized in
several aspects [49, 50].
Below we sketch a protocol for secure broadcast which we use in AT2D. This protocol is not
novel (unlike the probabilistic version we use for AT2P in §5), and it draws directly from the
signature-based algorithm due to Malkhi and Reiter [50]. We chose to use this protocol for its
simplicity. This description uses an underlying reliable broadcast primitive [19], and we use the
terms reliable-broadcast and reliable-deliver to denote the invocation and callback of this primitive.
To broadcast a messagem securely, a process s attaches a sequence number i to that message
and then disseminates the tuple (m, i) using reliable-broadcast. Upon reliable-delivery of (m, i),
every process p checks whether this is the first time it sees sequence number i from process s . If
yes, process p replies directly to s with a signed acknowledgment of the tuple (m, i). When process
s receives acknowledgments from a quorum of more than two thirds of the processes, s broadcasts
the set of obtained acknowledgments using reliable-broadcast. Any process can deliverm after
obtaining the correct set of acknowledgments for (m, i), and after having delivered all messages
from s that have sequence numbers smaller than i .
Intuitively, this algorithm ensures that any two delivered messages are “witnessed” by at least
one correct process. This way we ensure that messages from the same source, whether benign or
Byzantine, are delivered by benign processes in the same order.
5 AT2P: THE PROBABILISTIC CASE
AT2P implements an asset transfer algorithm in a probabilistic system model, by building on a
novel secure broadcast algorithm with probabilistic guarantees. In the rest of this section we first
discuss our system model more precisely (§5.1). We then present the secure broadcast algorithm in
three steps. First, we introduce an abstraction for broadcasting a single message with probabilistic
delivery guarantees (§5.2). Second, we refine this abstraction to make it consistent, ensuring that
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processes deliver the same single message (§5.3). Third, we obtain probabilistic secure broadcast
as a multi-shot abstraction over consistent broadcast (§5.4).
5.1 Preliminaries
We discuss the system model, including assumptions we make on the network and on the informa-
tion available both to correct and Byzantine processes. We also introduce notation that will be
valid throughout the rest of this section.
For all our probabilistic algorithms, we have the following assumptions:
(1) (Processes) The setΠ of processes partaking in the algorithm is fixed. Unless stated otherwise,
we let N = |Π | denote the number of processes, and refer to the i-th process as πi ∈ Π.
(2) (Links) Any two processes can communicate via reliable, authenticated, point-to-point
links [19].
(3) (Failures) At most a fraction f of the processes is Byzantine, i.e., subject to arbitrary failures.
Byzantine processes are under the control of the same adversary, and can take coordinated
action. We also assume that the adversary does not have access to the output of local
randomness sources of correct processes. Unless stated otherwise, we let ΠC ⊆ Π denote the
set of correct processes and C = |ΠC | = ⌈(1 − f )N ⌉ denote the number of correct processes.
(4) (Asynchrony) Byzantine processes can cause arbitrary but finite delays on any link, includ-
ing links between pairs of correct processes.
(5) (Anonimity) Byzantine processes cannot determine which correct processes another correct
process is communicating with.
(6) (Sampling) Every process has direct access to an oracle Ω that, provided with an integer
n ≤ N , yields the public keys of n distinct processes, chosen uniformly at random from Π.
We later weaken assumption (1) into an inequality, as we generalize our results to systems with
slow churn. Assumption (4) represents one of the main strengths of this work: messages can be
delayed arbitrarily and maliciously without compromising the security property of any of the
algorithms presented in this work. Assumption (5) represents the strongest constraint we put on
the knowledge of the adversary. We later show that, without this assumption, an adversary could
easily poison the view of the system of a targeted correct process without having to interfere
with any local randomness source. Even against ISP-grade adversaries, assumption (5) can be
implemented in practice by means of, e.g., onion routing [62] or private messaging [65] algorithms.
Assumption (6) reduces, in the permissioned case, to randomly sampling an exhaustive list of
processes. We later discuss how a membership sampling algorithm can be used, in conjunction
with Sybil resistance strategies, to implement the sampling oracle in the permissionless case (see
§5.5).
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5.2 Probabilistic broadcast
In this section, we introduce the probabilistic broadcast abstraction and discuss its properties.
This abstraction serves the purpose of reliably broadcasting a single message from a designated
(correct) sender to all correct processes. We then present Erdös-Rényi Gossip, a probabilistic
algorithm that implements probabilistic broadcast, and evaluate its security and complexity as a
function of its parameters. We use probabilistic broadcast in the implementation of Probabilistic
Double-Echo (see §5.3) to initially distribute a message from the designated sender to all correct
processes.
5.2.1 Definition. The probabilistic broadcast interface (instance pb, sender σ ) exposes the follow-
ing two events:
• Request: ⟨pb .Broadcast | m⟩: Broadcasts a messagem to all processes. This is only used by
σ .
• Indication ⟨pb .Deliver | m⟩: Delivers a messagem broadcast by process σ .
For any ϵ ∈ [0, 1], Probabilistic broadcast is ϵ-secure if:
(1) No duplication: No correct process delivers more than one message.
(2) Integrity: If a correct process delivers a messagem, and σ is correct, thenm was previously
broadcast by σ .
(3) ϵ-Validity: If σ is correct, and σ broadcasts a messagem, then σ eventually deliversm with
probability at least (1 − ϵ).
(4) ϵ-Totality: If a correct process delivers a message, then every correct process eventually
delivers a message with probabiity at least (1 − ϵ).
5.2.2 Algorithm. Algorithm 1 lists the implementation of Erdös-Rényi Gossip. This algorithm
distributes a single message2 across the system by means of gossip: upon reception, a correct
process relays the message to a set of randomly selected neighbors. The algorithm depends on one
integer parameter, G (expected gossip sample size), whose value we study in §C.
Initialization. Upon initialization, (line 11) a correct process randomly samples a value G¯ from a
Poisson distribution with expected value G, and uses the sampling oracle Ω to select G¯ distinct
processes that it will use to initialize its gossip sample G.
Link reciprocation. Once its gossip sample is initialized, a correct process sends a GossipSubscribe
message to all the processes in G (line 13). Upon receiving a GossipSubscribe message from a
2Note that one instance of probabilistic broadcast only distributes a single message. To disseminate multiple messages,
we use multiple instances of probabilistic broadcast.
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Algorithm 1 Erdös-Rényi Gossip
1: Implements:
2: ProbabilisticBroadcast, instance pb
3:
4: Uses:
5: AuthenticatedPointToPointLinks, instance al
6:
7: Parameters:
8: G: expected gossip sample size
9:
10: upon event ⟨pb .Init⟩ do
11: G = Ω(poisson(G));
12: for all π ∈ G do
13: trigger ⟨al .Send | π , [GossipSubscribe]⟩;
14: end for
15: delivered = ⊥;
16:
17: upon event ⟨al .Deliver | π , [GossipSubscribe]⟩ do
18: if delivered , ⊥ then
19: (messaдe, siдnature) = delivered ;
20: trigger ⟨al .Send | π , [Gossip,messaдe, siдnature]⟩;
21: end if
22: G ← G ∪ {π };
23:
24: procedure dispatch(messaдe, siдnature) is
25: if delivered = ⊥ then
26: delivered ← (messaдe, siдnature);
27: for all π ∈ G do
28: trigger ⟨al .Send | π , [Gossip,messaдe, siдnature]⟩;
29: end for
30: trigger ⟨pb .Deliver | messaдe⟩
31: end if
32:
33: upon event ⟨pb .Broadcast | messaдe⟩ do ▷ only process σ
34: dispatch(messaдe, siдn(messaдe));
35:
36: upon event ⟨al .Deliver | π , [Gossip,messaдe, siдnature]⟩ do
37: if veri f y(σ ,messaдe, siдnature) then
38: dispatch(messaдe, siдnature);
39: end if
40:
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process π (line 17), a correct process adds π to its own gossip sample G (line 22), and sends back
the gossiped message if it has already received it (line 20).
Gossip. When broadcasting the message (line 34), a correct designated sender σ signs the message
and sends it to every process in its sample G (line 28). Upon receiving a correctly signed message
from σ (line 37) for the first time (this is enforced by updating the value of delivered , line 25), a
correct process delivers it (line 30) and forwards it to every process in its gossip sample (line 28).
For a discussion on the correctness of Erdös-Rényi Gossip, we refer the interested reader
to §C.
5.3 Probabilistic consistent broadcast
In this section, we introduce the probabilistic consistent broadcast abstraction and discuss its prop-
erties. We then present Probabilistic Double-Echo, a probabilistic algorithm that implements
probabilistic consistent broadcast, and evaluate its security and complexity as a function of its
parameters.
The probabilistic consistent broadcast abstraction allows the set of correct processes to agree on
a message from a designated sender, potentially Byzantine. Probabilistic consistent broadcast is a
strictly stronger abstraction than probabilistic broadcast. Probabilistic broadcast only guarantees
that, if the sender is correct, all correct processes deliver its message and, if any correct process
delivers a message, every correct process delivers a message. Probabilistic consistent broadcast
also guarantees that, even if the sender is Byzantine, no two correct processes will deliver different
messages.
We use probabilistic consistent broadcast in the implementation of Sequenced Probabilistic
Double-Echo (see §5.4) as a way to consistently broadcast sequenced messages.
5.3.1 Definition. The probabilistic consistent broadcast interface (instance pcb, sender σ ) exposes
the following two events:
• Request: ⟨pcb .Broadcast | m⟩: Broadcasts a messagem to all processes. This is only used by
σ .
• Indication: ⟨pcb .Deliver | m⟩: Delivers a messagem broadcast by process σ .
For any ϵ ∈ [0, 1], Probabilistic consistent broadcast is ϵ-secure if:
(1) No duplication: No correct process delivers more than one message.
(2) Integrity: If a correct process delivers a messagem, and σ is correct, thenm was previously
broadcast by σ .
(3) ϵ-Validity: If σ is correct, and σ broadcasts a messagem, then σ eventually deliversm with
probability at least (1 − ϵ).
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(4) ϵ-Totality: If a correct process delivers a message, then every correct process eventually
delivers a message with probabiity at least (1 − ϵ).
(5) ϵ-Consistency: Every correct process that delivers a message delivers the same message
with probability at least (1 − ϵ).
5.3.2 Algorithm. Algorithm 2 lists the implementation of Probabilistic Double-Echo.
This algorithm consistently distributes a single message3 across the system, as follows:
• Initially, probabilistic broadcast distributes potentially conflicting copies of the message to
every correct process.
• Upon receiving a messagem from probabilistic broadcast, a correct process issues an Echo
message form.
• When enough Echo or Readymessages have been collected for the same messagem, a correct
process issues a Ready message form.
• When enough Readymessages have been collected for the same messagem, a correct process
deliversm.
A correct process collects Echo and Readymessages from three randomly selected samples (echo
sample, ready sample and delivery sample). The sizes of these samples are determined by three
integer parameters (E, R and D, respectively). Three additional integer parameters (Eˆ ≤ E, Rˆ ≤ R,
Dˆ ≤ D) represent thresholds to trigger the issue of Readymessages and the delivery of the message.
We discuss the values of the six parameters of Probabilistic Double-Echo in §D.
Sampling. Upon initialization (line 23), a correct process randomly selects three samples (an
echo sample E of size E, a ready sample R of size R, and a delivery sample D of size D).
Samples are selected with replacement by repeatedly calling Ω (line 16). A correct process sends an
EchoSubscribe message to all the processes in its echo sample, and a ReadySubscribe message
to all the processes in its ready and delivery samples (line 19).
Publish-subscribe. Unlike in the deterministic version of Authenticated Double-Echo, where
a correct process broadcasts its Echo and Ready messages to the whole system, here each process
only listens for messages coming from its samples (lines 58, 70, 73).
A correct process maintains an echo subscription set E˜ and a ready subscription set R˜.
Upon receiving a Subscribe message from a process π , a correct process adds π to E˜ (in case
of EchoSubscribe, line 37) or to R˜ (in case of ReadySubscribe, line 44). If a correct process
receives a Subscribe message after publishing an Echo or a Ready message, it also sends back
3Note that one instance of probabilistic consistent broadcast only distributes a single message. To disseminate multiple
messages, we use multiple instances of probabilistic consistent broadcast.
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Algorithm 2 Probabilistic Double-Echo
1: Implements:
2: ProbabilisticConsistentBroadcast, instance pcb
3:
4: Uses:
5: AuthenticatedPointToPointLinks, instance al
6: ProbabilisticBroadcast, instance pb
7:
8: Parameters:
9: E: echo sample size Eˆ: ready threshold
10: R: ready sample size Rˆ: feedback threshold
11: D: delivery sample size Dˆ: delivery threshold
12:
13: procedure sample(messaдe, size) is
14: ψ = ∅;
15: for size times do
16: ψ ← ψ ∪ Ω(1);
17: end for
18: for all π ∈ ψ do
19: trigger ⟨al .Send | π , [messaдe]⟩;
20: end for
21: returnψ ;
22:
23: upon event ⟨pcb .Init⟩ do
24: echo = ⊥; ready = ⊥; delivered = false;
25:
26: E = sample(EchoSubscribe,E); replies .echo = {⊥}E ;
27: R = sample(ReadySubscribe,R); replies .ready = {⊥}R ;
28: D = sample(ReadySubscribe, D); replies .delivery = {⊥}D ;
29:
30: E˜ = ∅; R˜ = ∅;
31:
32: upon event ⟨al .Deliver | π , [EchoSubscribe]⟩ do
33: if echo , ⊥ then
34: (messaдe, siдnature) = echo;
35: trigger ⟨al .Send | π , [Echo,messaдe, siдnature]⟩;
36: end if
37: E˜ ← E˜ ∪ {π };
38:
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39: upon event ⟨al .Deliver | π , [ReadySubscribe]⟩ do
40: if ready , ⊥ then
41: (messaдe, siдnature) = ready;
42: trigger ⟨al .Send | π , [Ready,messaдe, siдnature]⟩;
43: end if
44: R˜ ← R˜ ∪ {π };
45:
46: upon event ⟨pcb .Broadcast | messaдe⟩ do ▷ only process σ
47: trigger ⟨pb .Broadcast | [Send,messaдe, siдn(messaдe)]⟩;
48:
49: upon event ⟨pb .Deliver | [Send,messaдe, siдnature]⟩ do
50: if veri f y(σ ,messaдe, siдnature) then
51: echo ← (messaдe, siдnature);
52: for all ρ ∈ E˜ do
53: trigger ⟨al .Send | ρ, [Echo,messaдe, siдnature]⟩;
54: end for
55: end if
56:
57: upon event ⟨al .Deliver | π , [Echo,messaдe, siдnature]⟩ do
58: if π ∈ E and veri f y(σ ,messaдe, siдnature) and replies .echo[π ] = ⊥ then
59: replies .echo[π ] ← (messaдe, siдnature);
60: end if
61:
62: upon exists messaдe such that |{ρ ∈ E | replies .echo[ρ] = (messaдe, siдnature)}| ≥
Eˆ and ready = ⊥ do
63: ready ← (messaдe, siдnature);
64: for all ρ ∈ R˜ do
65: trigger ⟨al .Send | ρ, [Ready,σ ,messaдe, siдnature]⟩;
66: end for
67:
68: upon event ⟨al .Deliver | π , [Ready,messaдe, siдnature]⟩ do
69: if veri f y(σ ,messaдe, siдnature) then
70: if π ∈ R and replies .ready[π ] = ⊥ then
71: replies .ready[π ] ← (messaдe, siдnature);
72: end if
73: if π ∈ D and replies .delivery[π ] = ⊥ then
74: replies .delivery[π ] ← (messaдe, siдnature);
75: end if
76: end if
77:
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78: upon exists messaдe such that |{ρ ∈ R | replies .ready[ρ] = (messaдe, siдnature)}| ≥
Rˆ and ready = ⊥ do
79: ready ← (messaдe, siдnature);
80: for all ρ ∈ R˜ do
81: trigger ⟨al .Send | ρ, [Ready,σ ,messaдe, siдnature]⟩;
82: end for
83:
84: upon existsmessaдe such that |{ρ ∈ D | replies .delivery[ρ] = (messaдe, siдnature)}| ≥
Dˆ and delivered = false do
85: delivered ← true;
86: trigger ⟨pcb .Deliver | messaдe⟩;
87:
the previously published message (line 35,42). A correct process will only send its Echo and Ready
messages (lines 53, 65, 81) to its echo and ready subscription sets respectively.
Echo. The designated sender σ initially broadcasts its message using probabilistic broadcast (line
47). Upon pb.Deliver of a messagem (correctly signed by σ ) (line 49), a correct process sends an
Echo message form to all the nodes in its echo subscription set (line 53).
Ready. A correct process sends a Ready message for a messagem (correctly signed by σ ) to all
the processes in its ready subscription sample (lines 65, 81) upon collecting either of:
• At least Eˆ Echo messages form from its echo sample (line 62).
• At least Rˆ Ready messages form from its ready sample (line 78)
Delivery. Upon collecting at least Dˆ Ready messages for the same messagem (correctly signed
by σ ) from its delivery sample (line 84), a correct process deliversm (line 86).
For an analysis of Probabilistic Double-Echo, we refer the interested reader to §D.
5.4 Probabilistic secure broadcast
In this section, we introduce the probabilistic secure broadcast abstraction. This abstraction allows
correct processes to agree on a sequence of messages sent from a designated sender, potentially
Byzantine. Probabilistic secure broadcastis a strictly stronger abstraction than probabilistic consis-
tent broadcast, because the former allows for an arbitrary sequence of messages to be delivered
in a consistent order. We then present Sequenced Probabilistic Double-Echo, a probabilistic
algorithm that implements Probabilistic secure broadcast.
5.4.1 Definition. The probabilistic secure broadcastinterface (instance psb, sender σ ) exposes the
following two events:
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• Request: ⟨psb .Broadcast | m⟩: Broadcasts a messagem to all processes. This is only used by
process σ .
• Indication: ⟨psb .Deliver | m⟩: Delivers a messagem broadcast by process σ .
Definition 1. Let π be a correct process. Then π initially broadcasts (or delivers) a sequence of
messagesm1, . . . ,mn if the sequence of messages it broadcasts (or delivers) begins withm1, . . . ,mn .
For any ϵ ∈ [0, 1], we say that probabilistic secure broadcast is ϵ-secure if:
(1) No creation: If σ is correct, and σ never broadcasts more than n messages, then no correct
process delivers more than n messages.
(2) Integrity: If a correct process delivers a messagem, and σ is correct, thenm was previously
broadcast by σ .
(3) ϵ-Multi-validity: If σ is correct, and σ initially broadcastsm1, . . . ,mn , then σ eventually
initially deliversm1, . . . ,mn with probability at least (1 − ϵ)n .
(4) ϵ-Multi-totality: If a correct process delivers n messages, then every correct process even-
tually delivers n messages with probability at least (1 − ϵ)n .
(5) ϵ-Multi-consistency: Every correct process that delivers n messages initially delivers the
same sequence of n messages with probability at least (1 − ϵ)n .
5.4.2 Algorithm. Algorithm 3 presents the implementation of Sequenced Probabilistic Double-
Echo.
Sequenced Probabilistic Double-Echo consistently distributes across the system a sequence
of messages in consistent order. It does so by using one distinct instance of ProbabilisticConsistent-
Broadcast (§5.3) for each message in the sequence. Instances are incrementally numbered, which
allows for reordering on the receiver’s end.
Initialization. Upon initialization (line 7), all correct processes initialize one instance of Proba-
bilisticConsistentBroadcast (line 12), that will be used to consistently broadcast the first message.
Each process also initializes an array of all the messages received through probabilistic consistent
broadcast (line 11).
Broadcast. When broadcasting (line 19), the sender simply triggers pcb.Broadcast on the latest
instance of ProbabilisticConsistentBroadcast(line 20). It then initializes new instance of Proba-
bilisticConsistentBroadcast. The index of the new instance is maintained in the variable next , and
incremented in expand() (line 14).
Delivery. Upon pcb.Deliver (line 23), a correct process adds the message to the array of messages
that have been received. When the next expected message (i.e., the message with the lowest
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Algorithm 3 Sequenced Probabilistic Double-Echo
1: Implements:
2: ProbabilisticSecureBroadcast, instance psb
3:
4: Uses:
5: ProbabilisticConsistentBroadcast, instance pcb ▷ multiple instances
6:
7: upon event ⟨psb .Init⟩ do
8: next = 0;
9: expected = 0;
10:
11: messaдes[next] = ⊥;
12: Initialize a new instance pcb .next of ProbabilisticConsistentBroadcast;
13:
14: procedure expand() is
15: next ← next + 1;
16: messaдes[next] = ⊥;
17: Initialize a new instance pcb .next of ProbabilisticConsistentBroadcast;
18:
19: upon event ⟨psb .Broadcast | messaдe⟩ do ▷ only process σ
20: trigger ⟨pcb .next .Broadcast | messaдe⟩;
21: expand();
22:
23: upon event ⟨pcb .index .Deliver | messaдe⟩ do
24: messaдes[index] ←messaдe;
25:
26: uponmessaдes[expected] , ⊥ do
27: trigger ⟨psb .Deliver | messaдes[expected]⟩;
28: expected ← expected + 1;
29: if sel f , σ then
30: expand();
31: end if
32:
sequence number which has not yet been psb.Delivered) is pcb.Delivered (line 26), it is also
psb.Delivered (line 27).
5.5 Permissionless Environment
In this section we discuss the deployment of AT2 (in particular AT2P) in a permissionless environ-
ment.
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Our implementation of AT2P relies on Erdös-Rényi Gossip and Probabilistic Double-Echo,
both of which use an oracle Ω for obtaining random samples of processes. The size of a sample
is optimized for representativeness: this ensures, e.g., that with high probability only a bounded
fraction of a sample is Byzantine.
In private / permissioned systems with full membership view, Ω can be obtained from a simple
local randomness generator by picking a sample from a local list of processes.
In a public / permissionless system, however, sampling a very large, dynamically changing set
of processes is non-trivial, especially in a Byzantine environment.
Moreover, in a permissionless setting, the assumption of a limited fraction of faulty processes
might be broken by Sybil attacks.
To implement Ω, we use an existing Byzantine-tolerant sampling protocol (Brahms [16]). How-
ever, Brahms requires, but does not provide, a Sybil resistance mechanism.
As in all public / permissionless solutions, the problem of Sybil attacks needs to be addressed
in our permissionless variant as well. An effective solution that does not rely on any trusted
admission control scheme inevitably requires linking at least some critical parts of the protocol
to some real or virtual resource that is by its nature limited. In Bitcoin, this is achieved through
the (in)famous proof-of-work scheme, where computation power is used as this limited resource.
Algorand leverages the virtual currency itself to attribute “voting power” to participants (proof-
of-stake). Such proof-of-* mechanisms rely on a participant having a proof of her “right to vote”
that any other participant can easily verify. Moreover, these mechanisms are usually an integral
part of the protocol that uses them. The way AT2 prevents Sybil attacks has two advantages over
traditional methods.
First, our solution decouples the Sybil resistance mechanism from the protocol itself. Any sub-
protocol can be used to prove that participants are genuine (as opposed to Sybil identities). Proof-
of-work is just an example of a mechanism that such a sub-protocol can use. Other mechanisms,
even ones yet to be invented, are easily pluggable into our design.
Second, we relax the properties of the Sybil resistance mechanism that are necessary for it to be
used with AT2. In particular, while most curent strategies are based on a globally verifiable proof
of the ownership (or at least control) of some resource, we only require local verifiability: only
a small subset of participants needs to be able to verify a proof. Specifically, a participant only
presents proofs to those participants she is directly communicating with, and it is sufficient if
these participants are able to verify these proofs.
Removing the need for global verifiability opens new doors to much more efficient Sybil resis-
tance techniques, as we show below.
For the Sybil resistance sub-protocol, we propose a novel proof-of-bandwidth scheme. As the
name suggests, the voting power of participants is bound to the (generally limited) resource of
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bandwidth. A participant proves herself to the peers by sending them data over the network.
Participant A considers another participant B to be genuine (and takes into account B’s messages
when taking decisions) only if B periodically sends data to A. Nodes that fail to send enough data
to A are disregarded by A. Note that in general B cannot prove to anyone else than A that data has
been transmitted, but in our case this is sufficient (no need for global verifiability).
The advantage of this approach is that protocol data itself can serve as such proof, and thus no
additional resources need to be wasted, as is the case for proof-of-work or proof-of-storage. In the
case where the protocol itself does not generate enough data for a proof, even other completely
unrelated data exchange between two participants (e.g. BitTorrent traffic) can be used as proof.
Since we only require local verifiability, it is only up to the two communicating parties to agree on
what traffic constitutes a proof-of-bandwidth. In the absolutely worst case, where no otherwise
useful data can be exchanged between two participants, they can resort to exchanging garbage
data.
6 SHARING ACCOUNTS AMONG k PROCESSES
We now return to the crash-stop shared memory model defined in §2 and consider the general
case with an arbitrary owner map µ. We show that an asset-transfer object’s consensus number is
the maximal number of processes sharing an account. More precisely, the consensus number of an
asset-transfer object is maxa∈A |µ(a)|.
We say that an asset-transfer object, defined on a set of accounts A with an ownership map µ,
is k-shared iff maxa∈A |µ(a)| = k . In other words, the object is k-shared if µ allows at least one
account to be owned by k processes, and no account is owned by more than k processes.
We show that the consensus number of any k-shared asset transfer is k , which generalizes
our result in §2. We first show that k-shared asset transfer has consensus number at least k by
implementing consensus for k processes using only registers and an instance of k-shared asset
transfer. We then show that k-shared asset transfer has consensus number at most k by reducing
k-shared asset transfer to k-consensus, an object known to have consensus number k [40].
Lemma 1. Consensus has a wait-free implementation for k processes in the read-write shared memory
model equipped with a single k-shared asset-transfer object.
Proof. We now provide a wait-free algorithm that solves consensus among k processes using
only registers and an instance of k-shared asset-transfer. The algorithm is described in Figure 5.
Intuitively, k processes use one shared account a to elect one of them whose input value will
be decided. Before a process p accesses the shared account, p announces its input in a register
(line 1). Process p then tries to perform a transfer from account a to another account. The amount
withdrawn this way from account a is chosen specifically such that:
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Shared variables:
R[i], i ∈ 1, . . . ,k , k registers, initially R[i] = ⊥,∀i
AT , k-shared asset-transfer object containing:
– an account a with initial balance 2k
owned by processes 1, . . . ,k
– some account s
Upon propose(v):
1 R[p].write(v)
2 AT .trans f er (a, s, 2k − p))
3 return R[AT .read(a)].read()
Fig. 5. Wait-free implementation of consensus among k processes using a k-shared asset transfer. Code for
process p ∈ {1, . . . ,k}.
(1) only one transfer operation can ever succeed, and
(2) if the transfer succeeds, the remaining balance on a will uniquely identify process p.
To satisfy the above conditions, we initialize the balance of account a to 2k and have each process
p ∈ {1, . . . ,k} transfer 2k − p (line 2). Note that transfer operations invoked by distinct processes
p,q ∈ {1, . . . ,k} have arguments 2k−p and 2k−q, and 2k−p+2k−q ≥ 2k−k+2k−(k−1) = 2k+1.
The initial balance of a is only 2k and no incoming transfers are ever executed. Therefore, the first
transfer operation to be applied to the object succeeds (no transfer tries to withdraw more then
2k) and the remaining operations will have to fail due to insufficient balance. When p reaches line
3, at least one transfer must have succeeded:
(1) either p’s transfer succeeded, or
(2) p’s transfer failed due to insufficient balance, in which case some other process must have
previously succeeded.
Let q be the process whose transfer succeeded. Thus, the balance of account a is 2k − (2k − q) = q.
Since q performed a transfer operation, by the algorithm, q must have previously written its
proposal to the register R[q]. Regardless of whether p = q or p , q, reading the balance of account
a returns q and p decides the value of R[q]. □
To prove that k-shared asset transfer has consensus number at most k , we reduce k-shared asset
transfer to k-consensus. A k-consensus object exports a single operation propose that, the first
k times it is invoked, returns the argument of the first invocation. All subsequent invocations
return ⊥. Given that k-consensus is known to have consensus number exactly k [40], a wait-free
algorithm implementing k-shared asset transfer using only registers and k-consensus objects
implies that the consensus number of k-shared asset transfer is not more than k .
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Shared variables:
AS , atomic snapshot object
for each a ∈ A:
Ra[i], i ∈ Π, registers, initially [⊥, . . . ,⊥]
kCa[i], i ≥ 0, list of instances of k-consensus objects
Local variables:
hist: a set of completed trasfers, initially empty
for each a ∈ A:
committeda , initially ∅
rounda , initially 0
Upon transfer(a,b,x):
1 if p < µ(a) then
2 return false
3 tx = (a,b,x ,p, rounda)
4 Ra[p].write(tx)
5 collected = collect(a) \ committeda
6 while tx ∈ collected do
7 req = the oldest transfer in collected
8 prop = proposal(req,AS .snapshot())
9 decision = kCa[rounda].propose(prop)
10 hist = hist ∪ {decision}
11 AS .update(hist)
12 committeda = committeda ∪ {t : decision = (t , ∗)}
13 collected = collected \ committeda
14 rounda = rounda + 1
15 if (tx , success) ∈ hist then
16 return true
17 else
18 return false
Upon read(a):
19 return balance(a,AS .snapshot())
collect(a):
20 collected = ∅
21 for all i = Π do
22 if Ra[i].read() , ⊥ then
23 collected = collected ∪ {Ra[i].read()}
24 return collected
proposal((a,b,q,x), snapshot):
25 if balance(a, snapshot) ≥ x then
26 prop = ((a,b,q,x), success)
27 else
28 prop = ((a,b,q,x), failure)
29 return prop
balance(a, snapshot):
30 incoming = {tx : tx = (∗,a, ∗, ∗, ∗) ∧ (tx , success) ∈ snapshot}
31 outgoing = {tx : tx = (a, ∗, ∗, ∗, ∗) ∧ (tx , success) ∈ snapshot}
32 return q0(a) +
(∑
(∗,a,x,∗,∗)∈incoming x
)
−
(∑
(a,∗,x,∗,∗)∈outgoing x
)
Fig. 6. Wait-free implementation of a k-shared asset transfer object using k-consensus objects. Code for
process p.
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The algorithm reducing k-shared asset-transfer to k-consensus is given in Figure 6. Before
presenting a formal correctness argument, we first informally explain the intuition of the algorithm.
In our reduction, we associate a series of k-consensus objects with every account a. Up to k owners
of a use the k-consensus objects to agree on the order of outgoing transfers for a.
We maintain the state of the implemented k-shared asset transfer object is maintained using an
atomic snapshot object AS . Every process p uses a distinct entry of AS to store a set hist. hist is
a subset of all completed outgoing transfers from accounts that p owns (and thus is allowed to
debit). For example, if p is the owner of accounts d and e , p’s hist contains outgoing transfers from
d and e . Each element in the hist set is represented as ((a,b,x , s, r ), result), where a,b, and x are
the respective source account, destination account, and the amount transferred, s is the originator
of the transfer, and r is the round in which the transfer was invoked by the originator. The value of
result ∈ {success, failure} indicates whether the transfer succeeds or fails. A transfer becomes
“visible” when any process inserts it in its corresponding entry of AS .
To read the balance of account a, a process takes a snapshot of AS , and then sums the initial
balance q0(a) and amounts of all successful incoming transfers, and subtracts the amounts of
successful outgoing transfers found in AS . We say that a successful transfer tx is in a snapshot AS
(denoted by (tx , success) ∈ AS) if there exists an entry e in AS such that (tx , success) ∈ AS[e].
To execute a transfer o outgoing from account a, a process p first announces o in a register
Ra that can be written by p and read by any other process. This enables a “helping” mechanism
needed to ensure wait-freedom to the owners of a [37].
Next, p collects the transfers proposed by other owners and tries to agree on the order of the
collected transfers and their results using a series of k-consensus objects.
A transfer-result pair as a proposal for the next instance of k-consensus is chosen as follows.
Process p picks the “oldest” collected but not yet committed operation (based on the round number
rounda attached to the transfer operation when a process announces it; ties are broken using
process IDs). Then p takes a snapshot of AS and checks whether account a has sufficient balance
according to the state represented by the snapshot, and equips the transfer with a corresponding
success / failure flag. The resulting transfer-result pair constitutes p’s proposal for the next
instance of k-consensus. The currently executed transfer by process p returns as soon as it is
decided by a k-consensus object, the flag of the decided value (success/failure) indicating the
transfer’s response (true/false).
Lemma 2. The k-shared asset transfer object type has a wait-free implementation in the read-write
shared memory model equipped with k-consensus objects.
Proof. We essentially follow the footpath of the proof of Theorem 1. Fix an execution E of the
algorithm in Figure 6. Let H be the history of E.
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To perform a transfer o on an account a, p registers it in Ra[p] (line 4) and then proceeds through
a series of k-consensus objects, each time collecting Ra to learn about the transfers concurrently
proposed by other owners of a. Recall that each k-consensus object is wait-free. Suppose, by
contradiction, that o is registered in Ra but is never decided by any instance of k-consensus.
Eventually, however, o becomes the request with the lowest round number in Ra and, thus, some
instance of k-consensus will be only accessed with o as a proposed value (line 9). By validity of
k-consensus, this instance will return o and, thus, p will be able to complete o.
Let Ops be the set of all complete operations and all transfer operations o such that some process
completed the update operation (line 11) in E with an argument including o (the atomic snapshot
and k-consensus operation has been linearized). Intuitively, we include in Ops all operations that
took effect, either by returning a response to the user or by affecting other operations. Recall
that every such transfer operation was agreed upon in an instance of k-consensus, let it be kCo .
Therefore, for every such transfer operation o, we can identify the process qo whose proposal has
been decided in that instance.
We now determine a completion of H and, for each o ∈ Ops, we define a linearization point as
follows:
• If o is a read operation, it linearizes at the linearization point of the snapshot operation
(line 19).
• If o is a transfer operation that returns false, it linearizes at the linearization point of the
snapshot operation (line 8) performed by qo just before it invoked kCo .propose().
• If o is a transfer operation that some process included in the update operation (line 11), it
linearizes at the linearization point of the first update operation in H (line 11) that includes o.
Furthermore, if o is incomplete in H , we complete it with response true.
Let H¯ be the resulting complete history and let L be the sequence of complete operations of H¯
in the order of their linearization points in E. Note that, by the way we linearize operations, the
linearization of a prefix of E is a prefix of L. Also, by construction, the linearization point of an
operation belongs to its interval.
Now we show that L is legal and, thus, H is linearizable. We proceed by induction, starting with
the empty (trivially legal) prefix of L. Let Lℓ be the legal prefix of the first ℓ operation and op be
the (ℓ + 1)st operation of L. Let op be invoked by process p. The following cases are possible:
• op is a read(a): the snapshot taken at op’s linearization point contains all successful transfers
concerning a in Lℓ . By the induction hypothesis, the resulting balance is non-negative.
• op is a failed transfer(a,b,x): the snapshot taken at the linearization point of op contains all
successful transfers concerning a in Lℓ . By the induction hypothesis, the balance correspond-
ing to this snapshot non-negative. By the algorithm, the balance is less than x .
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• op is a successful transfer(a,b,x). Let Ls , s ≤ ℓ, be the prefix of Lℓ that only contains
operations linearized before the moment of time when qo has taken the snapshot just before
accessing kCo .
As before accessing kCo , q went through all preceding k-consensus objects associated with
a and put the decided values in AS , Ls must include all outgoing transfer operations for
a. Furthermore, Ls includes a subset of all incoming transfers on a. Thus, balance(a,Lk ) ≤
balance(a,Lℓ).
By the algorithm, as op = transfer(a,b,x) succeeds, we have balance(a,Lk ) ≥ x . Thus,
balance(a,Lℓ) ≥ x and the resulting balance in Lℓ+1 is non-negative.
Thus, H is linearizable. □
Theorem 3. A k-shared asset-transfer object has consensus number k .
Proof. It follows directly from lemma 1 that k-shared asset-transfer has consensus number at
least k . Moreover, it follows from lemma 2 that k-shared asset-transfer has consensus number at
most k . Thus, the consensus number of k-shared asset-transfer is exactly k . □
7 RELATEDWORK
In this section we discuss related work with regards to various parts of AT2.We start by considering
other asset transfer systems, both for the private (permissioned) and public (permissionless) setting.
We then elaborate on ordering of inputs, and finally we discuss work related to secure broadcast,
which is an important building block of AT2.
7.1 Asset Transfer Systems
The different flavors of AT2 are suitable for both a private (permissioned) and public (permission-
less) setting. A private setting implies the assumption of an access control mechanism, specifying
who is allowed to participate in the system. In this case, we assume that this mechanism is external
to the system itself. Private protocols, such as Corda [36], Hyperledger Fabric [7], or Vegvisir [41]
rely on such a mechanism.
Importantly, the access control mechanism rules out the possibility of Sibyl attacks [25], where
a malicious party can take control over a system by using many identities, toppling the one third
assumption on the fraction of Byzantine participants. Once this is done, the malicious party can
engage in a double-spending attack.
Decentralized systems for the public, i.e., permissionless, setting are open to the world. They do
not have an explicit access control mechanism and allow anyone to join. Systems which fall into
this category include Bitcoin [54], Ethereum [67], Avalanche [64], ByzCoin [43], Algorand [30],
Hybrid consensus [55], PeerCensus [24], or Solida [2]. To prevent malicious parties from overtaking
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the system, these systems rely on Sybil-proof techniques, e.g., proof-of-work [54], or proof-of-
stake [12].
These systems, whether they address the permissionless or the permissioned environment, seek
to solve consensus in their implementation. It is worth noting that many of these solutions can
allow for more than just transfers, and enable access to smart contracts. Our focus is, however, on
decentralized transfer systems, and the surprising result of this paper is that we can implement
such a system without resorting to consensus.
To deploy AT2 in a public setting where anybody can participate, Sibyl attacks need to be
addressed and the system needs to be scalable to accommodate many participants. This is possible
by using a Sybil-resistant and scalable implementation of secure broadcast, while keeping the
transfer algorithm (see Figure 4) unchanged. To the best of our knowledge, there is no such
implementation of secure broadcast in the literature so far. Our probabilistic secure broadcast
implementation is scalable; transfers can be accepted within O(log(N )) message delays ensuring
security with overwhelming probability. We also show how to make our protocol Sybil-resistant
(see §5.5) and thus deployable in an open (permissionless) environment.
7.2 Ordering Constraints
In the blockchain ecosystem, there exist several efforts to avoid building a totally ordered chain
of transfers. The idea is to replace the totally ordered linear structure of a blockchain with that
of a directed acyclic graph (DAG) for structuring the transfers in the system. Notable systems in
this spirit include Byteball [22], Vegvisir [41], the GHOST protocol [60], Corda [36], or Nano [47].
Even if these systems use a DAG to replace the classic blockchain, their algorithms still employ
consensus. As we show here, total order (obtained via consensus) is not necessary for implementing
decentralized transfers.
We can also use a DAG to characterize the relation between transfers in AT2, but we do not
resort to solving consensus to build the DAG, nor do we use the DAG in order to solve consensus.
More precisely, we can regard each account as having an individual history. Each such history is
managed by the corresponding account owner without depending on a global view of the system
state. Another way to characterize AT2 is that we do not build a totally ordered sequence of all
transfers in the system (like a classic blockchain [54]). Instead we maintain a per-owner sequence
of transfers. Each sequence is ordered individually (by its respective owner), and is loosely coupled
with other sequences (through dependencies established by causality).
Another parallel we can draw is between the accounts in our system (as we defined them in §2.2)
and conflict-free replicated data types (CRDTs) [59]. Specifically, similar to a CRDT, in AT2 we
support concurrent updates on different accounts while preserving consistency. Since each account
has a unique owner, this rules out the possibility of conflicting operations on each (correct) account.
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In turn, this ensures that the state at correct nodes always converges to a consistent version. In
the terminology of [59], we provide strong eventual consistency.
As we explained earlier, the ordering among transfers in AT2 is based on causality, as defined
through the happened-before relationship of Lamport [45]. Various causally-consistent algorithms
exist [19, 48]. One problematic aspect in these algorithms is that the metadata associated with
tracking dependencies can be a burden [5, 10, 52]. This happens because such algorithms track
all potential causal dependencies. In our AT2 algorithm for the message passing model (Figure 4)
we track dependencies explicitly [10], permitting a more efficient implementation with a smaller
set of dependencies. More concretely, we specify that each transfer outgoing from an account
only depends on previous transfers outgoing from and incoming to that—and only that—account,
ignoring the transfers that affect other (irrelevant) accounts.
7.3 Asynchronous Agreement Protocols
The important insight that an asynchronous broadcast-style abstraction suffices for transfers
appears in the literature as early as 2002, due to Pedone and Schiper [56]. Duan et. al. [26]
introduce efficient Byzantine fault-tolerant protocols for storage and also build on this insight, as
does recent work by Gupta [34] on financial transfers which is the closest to us. To the best of our
knowledge, however, we are the first to consider this insight formally, prove it, and build practical
systems around consensusless algorithms.
An important strength of the whole AT2 class of algorithms is that they are asynchronous,
meaning that they do not have to rely inherently on timeouts to ensure liveness guarantees. This is
in contrast to deterministic consensus-based solutions. Such solutions have to resort to fine-tuned
timeout parameters which affect their performance [14, 53].
Asynchronous protocols for consensus exist, but they typically employ heavy cryptography
relying on randomization to overcome the FLP impossibility [28, 42]. A few recent efforts are trying
to make these protocols more efficient [6, 11, 26, 53]. These asynchronous protocol are designed
for a relatively small- to medium-scale, similar to our deterministic algorithm AT2D. Compared
to AT2D, asynchronous consensus protocols have higher complexity and ensure probabilistic
guarantees.
8 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we revisited the problem of implementing a decentralized asset transfer system. Since
the rise of the Bitcoin cryptocurrency, this problem has garnered significant innovation. Most of
the innovation, however, has focused on improving the original solution which Bitcoin proposed,
namely, that of using a consensus mechanism to build a blockchain where transactions across the
whole system are totally ordered.
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We did not aim to investigate current consensus-based solutions and push the envelope on
performance or other metrics. Instead, we showed that we can implement a decentralized transfer
system without resorting to consensus. To this end, we first precisely defined the transfer system
object type and proved that it has consensus number one if a single account is not shared bymultiple
processes. That is, it occupies the lowest rank of the consensus hierarchy and can be implemented
without the need for solving consensus. We proved this surprising result by borrowing from the
theory of concurrent objects, and then leveraged the result to build AT2, the first consensusless
transfer system.
A consensusless solution for decentralized transfers has multiple advantages. Concretely, the
transfer algorithm in AT2 is not subject to the FLP impossibility [28]. Additionally, AT2 is signifi-
cantly simpler than consensus-based solutions (because it relies on a simpler secure broadcast
primitive) and exhibits higher performance.
We compared the performance of AT2 to that of a transfer system based on BFT-Smart, a state-
of-the-art consensus-based state machine replication system. AT2 provides performance superior
to that of the consensus-based solution. In systems of up to 100 replicas, regardless of system size,
we observed a throughput improvement ranging from 1.5x to 6x , while achieving a decrease in
latency of up to 2x .
We implemented AT2D for a private (permissioned) environment that is prone to Byzantine
failures and where participants do not need to trust each other. This implementation is easily
extensible to the large-scale permissionless setting, and this is the focus of our concurrent work.
Our preliminary results are highly encouraging. Most notably, we can obtain sub-second transfer
execution on a global scale deployment of thousands of nodes.
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Appendices
A SECURE BROADCAST
A central building block of our AT2MP algorithm is the secure broadcast primitive. We now give a
more formal discussion of this primitive, which we use for establishing the correctness of AT2MP .
Intuitively, secure broadcast ensures that correct processes receive the same sequence ofmessages
broadcast from a given sender, even if that sender is malicious (Byzantine). There are multiple
algorithms for secure broadcast, exhibiting various tradeoffs (§4.1). In the rest of this discussion, we
draw directly from the pioneering work of Malkhi and Reiter [50] (called secure reliable multicast
therein).
Formally, letM be a set ofmessages. A secure broadcast protocol exports a broadcast(m) primitive,
wherem ∈ M, and triggers callback events deliver(p,m), wherem ∈ M and p ∈ Π. The protocol
satisfies the following properties:
• Integrity: a correct process executes deliver(p,m) at most once, and, in case the sender
process p is benign, only if p called broadcast(m).
• Agreement: if p and q are correct and p executes deliver(r ,m), then q eventually executes
deliver(r ,m).
• Validity: if p is correct and executes broadcast(m), then p eventually executes deliver(p,m).
• Source Order: if p and q are benign and p executes deliver(r ,m) before deliver(r ,m′), then
q does not execute deliver(r ,m′) before executing deliver(r ,m). Moreover, if r is benign and
broadcasts m and afterwards broadcasts m′, then no benign process delivers these two
messages in the opposite order.
Note that, unlike Byzantine agreement [46], secure broadcast does not guarantee that some
message is delivered when the sender is faulty.
Intuitively, we need to make sure that a message is delivered if and only if a quorum of more
than two thirds of processes accepted it. Every delivered message must be equipped with a proof :
a set of acknowledgements cryptographically signed by a quorum of processes proving that they
accepted that message.
To ensure the source order property, upon broadcasting any message, a benign process p tags
the message with a monotonically growing sequence number. A benign process accepts (and
acknowledges) a new message received from p only once it has accepted all messages from p with
lower sequence numbers and it received no different message from p with the same sequence
number. To broadcast a message, the sender sends it to all the processes, waits until a quorum of
them accepts it, and resends the message attaching the corresponding proof. Once a benign process
receives a message equipped with a proof from p, it resends the message to all (to ensure the
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agreement property) and, once the previous message broadcast by p has been delivered, delivers
the message.
B CORRECTNESS OF AT2MP ALGORITHM
We focus on AT2MP , our asset transfer algorithm for the message passing setting based on secure
broadcast, which we described earlier in Figure 4. We first prove an auxiliary lemma.
Lemma 3. In any infinite execution of algorithm AT2MP (Figure 4), every operation performed by a
correct process eventually completes.
Proof. A transfer operation that fails or a read operation invoked by a correct process returns
immediately (lines 11 and 15, respectively).
Consider a transfer operationT invoked by a correct process p that succeeds (i.e., passes the check
in line 10), so p broadcasts a message with the transfer details using secure broadcast (line 12).
By the validity property of secure broadcast, p eventually delivers the message (via the secure
broadcast callback, line 16) and adds it to the toValidate set. By the algorithm, this message includes
a set deps of operations (called h, line 17) that involve p’s account. This set includes transfers that
process p delivered and validated after issuing the prior successful outgoing transfer (or since the
initial system time if there is no such transfer) but before issuing T (lines 12 and 13).
As process p is correct, it operates on its own account, respects the sequence numbers, and
issues a transfer only if it has enough balance on the account. Thus, when it is delivered by p,
T must satisfy the first three conditions of the Valid predicate (lines 32–34). Moreover, by the
algorithm, all dependencies (labeled h in function Valid) included in T are in the history hist[p]
and, thus the fourth validation condition (line 35) also holds.
Thus, p eventually validates T and completes the operation by returning true in line 29. □
Theorem 4. Algorithm AT2MP (Figure 4) implements an asset-transfer object type.
Proof. Fix an execution E of the algorithm, let H be the corresponding history.
Let V denote the set of all messages that were delivered (line 16) and validated (line 32) at
correct processes in E. Every message m = [(q,d,y, s),h] ∈ V is put in hist[q] (line 23) and
hist[d] (line 24). We define an order ⪯⊆ V × V as follows. For m = [(q,d,y, s),h] ∈ V and
m′ = [(r ,d ′,y ′, s ′),h′] ∈ V , we havem ⪯ m′ if and only if one of the following conditions holds:
• q = r and s < s ′,
• (r ,d ′,y ′, s ′) ∈ h, or
• there existsm′′ ∈ V such thatm ⪯ m′′ andm′′ ⪯ m′.
By the source order property of secure broadcast (see §A), correct processes p and r deliver
messages from any process q in the same order. By the algorithm in Figure 4, a message from
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q with a sequence number i is added by a correct process to toValidate set only if the previous
message from q added to toValidate had sequence number i − 1 (line 18). Furthermore, a message
m = [(q,d,y, s),h] is validated at a correct process only if all messages in h have been previously
validated (line 35). Therefore, ⪯ is acyclic and thus can be extended to a total order.
Let S be the sequential history constructed from any such total order on messages inV in which
everymessagem = [(q,d,y, s),h] is replacedwith the invocation-response pair transfer(q,d,y); true.
By construction, every operation transfer(q,d,y) in S is preceded by a sequence of transfers that
ensure that the balance of q does not drop below y (line 34). In particular, S includes all outgoing
transfers from the account of q performed previously by q itself. Additionally S may order some
incoming transfer to q that did not appear at hist[q] before the corresponding (q,d,y, s) has been
added to it. But these “unaccounted” operations may only increase the balance of q (line 24) and,
thus, it is indeed legal to return true.
By construction, for each correct process p, S respects the order of successful transfers issued by
p. Thus, the subsequence of successful transfers in H “looks” linearizable to the correct processes:
H , restricted to successful transfers witnessed by the correct processes, is consistent with a a legal
sequential history S .
Let p be a correct process in E. Now letVp denote the set of all messages that were delivered
(line 16) and validated (line 32) at p in E. Let ⪯p be the subset of ⪯ restricted to the elements inVp .
Obviously, ⪯p is cycle-free and we can again extend it to a total order. Let Sp be the sequential
history build in the same way as S above. Similarly, we can see that Sp is legal and, by construction,
consistent with the local history of all operations of p (including reads and failed transfers).
By Lemma 3, every operation invoked by a correct process eventually completes. Thus, E indeed
satisfies the properties of an asset-transfer object type. □
C ANALYSIS OF ERDÖS-RÉNYI GOSSIP
We now discuss the correctness of Erdös-Rényi Gossip.
No duplication. : A correct process maintains a delivered variable that it checks and updates
before delivering a message. This prevents any correct process from delivering more than one
message.
Integrity. : Before broadcasting a message, the sender signs that message with its private key.
Before delivering a messagem, a correct process verifiesm’s signature. Under the assumption that
signatures cannot be forged, this prevents any correct process from delivering a message that was
not previously broadcast by the sender.
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Validity. : Upon broadcasting a message, the sender also immediately delivers it. Since this
happens deterministically, and thus Erdös-Rényi Gossip satisfies 0-validity, independently from
the parameter G.
C.1 Totality
Erdös-Rényi Gossip satisfies ϵt -totality with ϵt upper-bounded by a function that decays expo-
nentially with G, and polynomially increases with the fraction f of Byzantine faults.
Indeed, the network of connections established among the correct processes is an undirected
Erdős–Rényi graph, and totality is satisfied if such graph is connected. This allows us to bound
the probability of totality not being satisfied, using a well-known result on the connectivity of
Erdős–Rényi graphs.
Upon initialization, a correct process randomly selects a sample of other processes (it uses an
oracle to achieve this, see Assumption 6) with which it will exchange messages.
We start by noting that every link is eventually reciprocated by correct processes, i.e., if a correct
process π is in the sample of ρ, then ρ will eventually be in the sample of π (this is due to the fact
that messages are always eventually delivered, see Assumption 4).
We consider the sub-graph of connections only between correct processes. This network is
eventually undirected. We show that, if such graph is connected, then Erdös-Rényi Gossip
satisfies totality. This is due to the fact that every message will eventually propagate through all
the gossip links, reaching every correct process (again, due to Assumption 4).
We show that any two correct processes have an independent probability of being connected.
This is due to the fact that, upon initialization, the number of elements in a correct process’ gossip
sample is sampled from a Poisson distribution. Poisson distributions quickly limit to binomial
distributions for large systems, and we show that selecting a binomially distributed number of
distinct objects from a set is equivalent to selecting each object with an independent probability.
This proves that the sub-graph of connections between correct processes is an Erdős–Rényi graph.
Erdős–Rényi graphs are well known in literature [3] to display a connectivity phase transition:
when the expected number of connections each node has exceeds the logarithm of the number
of nodes, the probability of the graph being connected steeply increases from 0 to 1 (in the
limit of infinitely large systems, this increase becomes a step function). We use that result to
compute the probability of the sub-graph of correct processes being connected and, consequently,
of Erdös-Rényi Gossip satisfying totality.
Figure 7 shows the ϵ-security of Erdös-Rényi Gossip, as a function of the gossip sample size
(G), the fraction of Byzantine failures (f ) and the size of the system (N ).
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Fig. 7. Upper bound for the ϵ-security of Erdös-Rényi Gossip, as a function of the gossip sample size (G),
the fraction of Byzantine failures (f ), and the system size (N ).
D ANALYSIS OF PROBABILISTIC DOUBLE-ECHO
We now discuss the correctness of Probabilistic Double-Echo.
No duplication. A correct process maintains a delivered variable that it checks and updates before
delivering a message. This prevents any correct process from delivering more than one message.
Integrity. : Before broadcasting a message, the sender signs that message with its private key.
Before delivering a messagem, a correct process verifiesm’s signature. Under the assumption that
signatures cannot be forged, this prevents any correct process from delivering a message that was
not previously broadcast by the sender.
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In order to study validity, totality and consistency, we first establish some auxiliary results.
D.1 Auxiliary results
For a correct process, the execution of Probabilistic Double-Echo reduces to three operations:
publishing an Echomessage, publishing a Readymessage, and delivering a message. Each operation
is triggered by one or more conditions:
• A correct process publishes an Echo message upon pb.Deliver of a Send message.
• A correct process publishes a Ready message upon collecting either enough Echo messages
from its echo sample, or enough Ready messages from its ready sample.
• A correct process delivers a message upon collecting enough Readymessages from its delivery
sample.
We study the probability of each condition being fulfilled in steps.
Definition 2 (Ready, E-ready, R-ready). Let π be a correct process, letm be a message. Then:
• π is Ready form if it eventually publishes a Ready message form.
• π is E-ready form if it is ready form as a result of having collected enough Echo messages
form.
• π is R-ready form if it is ready form as a result of having collected enough Ready messages
form.
Let π be a correct process, letm be a message.
E-ready probability. We compute lower and upper bounds for the probability of π being E-ready
form, given the number of correct processes that echo (i.e., publish an Echo message for)m.
Echo samples are uniformly picked with replacement from the set of processes (correct processes
use an oracle to achieve this, see Assumption 6). Therefore, each element of π ’s echo sample has
an independent probability of being Byzantine and, if correct, of having echoedm.
Let ρ be an element of π ’s echo sample. We consider two scenarios. In the first scenario, no
Byzantine process ever sends an Echomessage form. In this scenario, the probability of π receiving
an Echo message form from ρ reduces to the probability of ρ being correct and having echoedm
(this is due to the fact that messages are always eventually delivered, see Assumption 4).
In the second scenario, all Byzantine processes send an Echo message form to all the correct
subscribed processes. In this scenario, the probability of π receiving an Eccho message form from
ρ reduces to the probability of ρ being Byzantine, or ρ being correct and having echoedm.
The probability of π being E-ready form is minimized in the first scenario, and maximized in
the second. Both probabilities can be computed by noting that the number of Echo messages that
π receives is binomially distributed.
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Ready feedback. We study the feedback mechanism produced by correct processes being R-ready
form, i.e., ready as a result of having received enough Ready messages form.
Ready samples are uniformly picked with replacement from the set of processes. We define
a random ready multigraph д allowing multi-edges and loops whose nodes represent the set
of correct processes. The predecessors4 of a node ν represent the correct processes in ν ’s ready
sample.
We introduce Threshold Contagion, a game played on the nodes of д where readiness for
m spreads like a disease: an infected node represents a correct process that is ready form, and
whenever enough predecessors of a node ν are infected, ν becomes infected (i.e., R-ready) as well.
Threshold Contagion is played in rounds. At the beginning of each round, a player infects
an arbitrary set of nodes (this models a set of processes being E-ready form). Throughout the
rest of the round, the disease automatically propagates to all the nodes that have enough infected
predecessors.
Given the number of rounds and the number of nodes infected per round, we use Markov chains
to compute the probability distribution underlying the number of nodes that are infected at the
end of Threshold Contagion.
We use Threshold Contagion in three settings:
• When evaluating validity, a correct sender takes the role of the player in a single-round
game of Threshold Contagion.
When broadcasting, the correct sender uses probabilistic broadcast to distributem. Unless the
totality of probabilistic broadcast is compromised, every correct process eventually publishes
an Echomessage form. Given the fraction of Byzantine processes, we compute the probability
of any correct process being E-ready form.
The number of correct processes that are E-ready form is used as input to (the single round
of) Threshold Contagion; its outcome represents the number of correct processes that are
ready form. This allows us to compute the probability of a correct process (and, in particular,
the sender) eventually deliveringm.
• When evaluating totality, a Byzantine sender takes the role of the player in a multi-round
game of Threshold Contagion. The game starts with no infected nodes. At the beginning
of each round, the player infects one healthy node; throughout the round, the infection
propagates until either all nodes are infected, or no uninfected node has enough infected
predecessors.
4Node µ is a predecessor of node ν in the multigraph д if (µ → ν ) ∈ д. Since multigraphs allow for multiple edges, the
set of predecessors of a node is a multiset.
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In order to compromise totality, a Byzantine adversary must cause at least one, but not all
correct processes to deliver a message.
We show that a Byzantine adversary that can cause processes to become E-ready for arbitrary
messages can easily perform an attack to compromise totality. We therefore restrict ourselves
to the case where the Byzantine adversary can arbitrarily cause any correct process to be
E-ready for only one messagem, and assume that totality is compromised if the adversary
can cause two distinct processes to be E-ready for two distinct messages. By doing so, we
effectively compute an upper bound for the probability of totality being compromised.
Under Assumption 5, the adversary has no knowledge of any correct process’ ready sample.
As a result of this, we later show (see §D.3) that every action implemented by the adversary
can be modeled by a multi-round game of Threshold Contagion.
Intuitively, lacking any information to meaningfully distinguish correct processes with
respect to the topology of the ready multigraph, the minimal action the adversary can
perform on the system is causing a single correct process to become E-ready form. As a
result, zero or more additional correct processes become R-ready. The adversary can then
carry on, causing more correct processes to become E-ready form, or stop.
In a game of Threshold Contagion, therefore, the adversary’s strategy reduces to playing
in rounds, and stopping as soon as any process deliversm. At the end of each round, we
compute the probability of at least one, but not all correct processes deliveringm. Totality is
compromised is this happens in any round.
• When evaluating consistency, a Byzantine sender takes the role of the player in a single-
round game of Threshold Contagion.
Letm andm′ be two conflicting messages. As we do when evaluating totality, we compute an
upper bound for consistency by assuming that if any two correct processes become E-ready
form andm′, then consistency is compromised.
Under the assumption that correct processes can be E-ready for at most one message, ifm
andm′ are delivered by at least one correct process, then eitherm orm′ is delivered without
any correct process being E-ready for it.
In order to compute the probability ofm being delivered even if no correct process is E-ready
form, we consider a scenario where all Byzantine processes send a Ready message form to
their correct subscribers. Noting how, in this scenario, the behavior of a Byzantine process is
identical to that of a correct process that is E-ready form, we can compute the probability of
m being delivered by playing a game of Threshold Contagion where Byzantine processes
are included as initially infected nodes.
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Delivery probability. We compute lower and upper bounds for the probability of π deliveringm,
given the number of correct processes that are ready form.
This can be achieved using the same technique that we employed when computing lower and
upper bounds for the probability of a process being E-ready form, given the number of correct
process that echoedm. For the sake of brevity, we don’t repeat that analysis here.
Early consistency. We call early consistency the condition where no two correct processes are
E-ready for two different messages,m1 andm2.
As we see in §§ D.3 and D.4, we compute upper bounds for the probability of compromising
totality and consistency by assuming that if early consistency is compromised, then both totality
and consistency are compromised.
Under Assumption 5, the adversary has no knowledge of the echo sample of any correct process.
Therefore, the adversary has no way of meaningfully distinguishing two correct processes, based
on the effect that their Echo messages will have on the system.
We consider a scenario where an adversary releases two different messagesm1 andm2, and can:
• Cause any correct process to echo any ofm1 andm2.
• Determine if any correct process is E-ready form1 orm2.
Early consistency is compromised if at least one correct process is E-ready form1, and one correct
process is E-ready form2.
We start by noting that, if the echo threshold is larger than half of the sample size, then the order
in which the adversary causes each process to echo eitherm1 orm2 does not affect the probability
of compromising early consistency.
Therefore, any adversary that causes n1 correct processes to echom1, and n2 correct processes
to echom2, has the same probability of compromising early consistency as one that first causes n1
correct processes to echom1, then n2 correct processes to echom2.
Moreover, the probability of any correct process being E-ready form2 is an increasing function
of n2. Given that at least one correct process is E-ready form1, the probability of compromising
early consistency is maximized by the adversary that maximizes n2.
Therefore, the probability of compromising early consistency is maximized by an adversary that
causes one correct process at a time to echom1, until at least one correct process is E-ready for
m1, then causes all the other correct processes to echom2.
An adversary could release more than two different messages. We argue, however, that the
adversary maximizes the probability of violating early consistency using only two messages. If
the adversary needs to make one process E-ready form1 and another process E-ready form2, it
needs enough echoes form1 as well as enough choes form2. The more echoes for each respective
message, the higher the chance of a process becoming E-ready for it. Intuitively, introducing a
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third message would only decrease the chance of a correct process becoming E-ready for either of
m1 andm2.
Feedback creation. We compute an upper bound for the probability ofm being delivered by any
correct process, given that no correct process is E-ready form.
In order to do so, we consider a scenario where every Byzantine process sends a Ready message
for m to every correct subscriber. Noting that, in this scenario, a Byzantine process behaves
identically to a correct process that is E-ready form, we compute the probability underlying the
number of correct processes that are ready form by playing a game of Threshold Contagion
where also the Byzantine processes are included as initially infected nodes.
We then use the upper bound on the delivery probability to bound the probability ofm being
delivered.
D.2 Validity
We compute an upper bound for the probability of validity being compromised.
Validity is compromised if a correct sender broadcasts, but does not deliver, a messagem. We
compute an upper bound for the probability of this happening by assuming that, if the totality
of probabilistic broadcast is compromised, then the validity of Probabilistic Double-Echo is
compromised as well.
If the totality of probabilistic broadcast is not compromised, then every correct process publishes
an Echo message for m. We use our lower bound on the E-ready probability to compute the
probability distribution underlying the number of correct processes that are E-ready form.
We then play a game of Threshold Contagion to compute the probability distribution under-
lying the number of correct processes that are ready form.
Finally, we use our lower bound for the delivery probability to bound the probability that a
correct process (and, specificaly, the sender) will not deliverm.
D.3 Totality
We compute an upper bound for the probability of totality being compromised.
Totality is compromised if at least one, but not all processes deliver a message. We compute an
upper bound for the probability of this happening by assuming that totality is compromised if
early consistency is compromised.
If early consistency is not compromised, then a Byzantine sender will cause processes to be
E-ready for at most one messagem.
We consider a scenario where a Byzantine adversary can:
• Cause any correct process to be E-ready form.
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• Determine if any correct process deliveredm.
Under Assumption 5, the adversary has no knowledge of neither the ready nor the delivery
sample of any correct process. Therefore, the adversary has no way of meaningfully distinguishing
two correct processes, based on the effect that their Ready messages will have on the system.
Let n represent the number of correct processes that are E-ready form. The number of processes
that deliverm is a non decreasing function of n. Therefore, the probability of compromising totality,
given that at least one correct process deliveredm, is maximized by the adversary that minimizes
n.
The adversary that has the highest probability of compromising totality, therefore, will cause
one correct process at a time to be E-ready form until at least one correct process deliversm.
Totality is compromised if at least one correct process does not deliverm.
We model the above using a multi-round game of Threshold Contagion, where the player
infects one more uninfected node at the beginning of each round. At the end of each round, we
use both our bounds for the delivery probability to determine whether or not totality can be
compromised at that round.
D.4 Consistency
We compute an upper bound for the probability of consistency being compromised.
Consistency is compromised if two correct processes deliver two conflicting messages,m andm′.
We compute an upper bound for the probability of this happening by assuming that consistency is
compromised if early consistency is compromised.
If early consistency is not compromised, but bothm andm′ are delivered by at least one correct
process, then eitherm orm′ is delivered without any correct process being E-ready for it. We
bound the probability of this happening using our result on feedback creation.
E ANALYSIS OF SEQUENCED PROBABILISTIC DOUBLE-ECHO
We now discuss the correctness of Sequenced Probabilistic Double-Echo.
No creation. A correct process delivers a message only if it was previously pcb.Delivered. More-
over, pcb.Broadcast is invoked by the sender process only upon psb.Broadcast.
Since probabilistic consistent broadcast satisfies no duplication, each instance of pcb will
deliver at most once. Since probabilistic consistent broadcast also satisfies integrity, no correct
process will pcb.Deliver without a corresponding invocation of pcb.Broadcast on the side of the
sender.
Therefore, if the sender never broadcasts more than n messages, then no correct process will
deliver more than n messages.
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Integrity. A correct process delivers a message only if it was previously pcb.Delivered. Moreover,
pcb.Broadcast is invoked by the sender process only upon psb.Broadcast.
Since probabilistic consistent broadcast satisfies integrity, then no correct process will deliver
a messagem, unlessm was previously broadcast by the sender.
E.1 Multi-validity
Probabilistic secure broadcast satisfies ϵ-multi-validity if the underlying abstraction of proba-
bilistic consistent broadcast satisfies ϵ-validity.
If the sender σ is correct, and it initially broadcastsm1, . . . ,mn , then σ pcb.(i − 1).Broadcastsmi
for every i ∈ {1, . . . ,mi }
If probabilistic consistent broadcast satisfies ϵ-validity, then eachmi is eventually pcb.Delivered
by σ with probability at least (1 − ϵ). Therefore,m1, . . . ,mn are eventually pcb.Delivered with
probability at least (1 − ϵ)n .
Upon pcb.Deliver ofmi ,messaдes[i − 1] is set tomi . When allm1, . . . ,mn are pcb.Delivered,
the first n entries ofmessaдes are updated to a value different than ⊥. As a result,m1, . . . ,mn are
delivered in sequence.
Consequently, the sender process deliversm1, . . . ,mn with probability at least (1 − ϵ)n .
E.2 Multi-totality
Probabilistic secure broadcast satisfies ϵ-multi-totality if the underlying abstraction of proba-
bilistic consistent broadcast satisfies ϵ-totality.
Let π be a correct process. If π delivered n messages, thenmessaдes[j] , ⊥ for all j ∈ {0, . . . ,n−
1}. Moreover, if π is correct, thenmessaдes[j] is set to a value other than ⊥ only upon pcb.j .Deliver.
Each instance of pcb satisfies totality with a probability at least (1−ϵ). Therefore, with probability
at least (1−ϵ)n , all pcb.j satisfy totality, and every correct process eventually setsmessaдes[j] , ⊥,
with j ∈ {0, . . . ,n − 1}.
Consequently, every correct process delivers n messages with probability at least (1 − ϵ)n .
E.3 Multi-consistency
Probabilistic secure broadcast satisfies ϵ-multi-consistency if the underlying abstraction of
probabilistic consistent broadcast satisfies ϵ-consistency.
Let π , ρ be two correct processes. If π and ρ initially delivered m1, . . . ,mn and m′1, . . . ,m′n
respectively, then, for every i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, π pcb.(i − 1).Deliveredmi , and ρ pcb.(i − 1).Delivered
m′i .
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Each instance of probabilistic consistent broadcast satisfies consistency with probability at least
(1−ϵ). Therefore, with probability at least (1−ϵ)n , pcb.j satisfies consistency for all j ∈ {0, . . . ,n−1},
andmi =m′i for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}.
Therefore, with probability at least (1−ϵ)n , all correct processes that initially deliver n messages
deliverm1, . . . ,mn .
